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INTRODUCTION
The director of a small charity faces a tough predicament. He needs
money for growing medical expenses. He knows he can quietly dip into
his charity’s funds to meet these mounting obligations. However, the
question he is most concerned about is: Will anyone notice if funds are
missing?
Traditionally, the state attorney general’s office has been responsible
for overseeing a state’s charitable sector and ensuring directors’
compliance with fiduciary standards.1 Scholars have long criticized the
current charitable oversight system.2 Louisiana is no exception. In
Louisiana, no decisions have been reported of the attorney general
bringing suit against a charitable director for violating good governance
standards. In fact, even when parties other than the attorney general
challenge a charitable organization’s operations, courts have passed on the
opportunity to decide cases using laws relating to nonprofit organizations,
choosing instead to decide the cases using contract law.3
Despite many calls for change in the enforcement model for charitable
oversight,4 states have left the authority to police charities with the
respective state attorney general’s office.5 Many commentators believe
that state attorney general offices are understaffed and underfinanced, and
this lack of resources prevents them from holding directors accountable
for violating their fiduciary responsibilities.6 Given the challenges facing
the current system of enforcement, these same scholars have suggested a

Copyright 2015, by MAXWELL B. KALLENBERGER.
1. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit
Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’
Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 403 (2012).
2. See infra Part III.
3. See, e.g., New Orleans Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. S. Reg’l Opera Endowment
Fund, 993 So. 2d 791, 799 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (deciding the case on contract law
rather than nonprofit law when a charitable trust was accused of misappropriating
assets).
4. See infra Part III.
5. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5142(a)(5), 5250, 6511 (West 2014); N.Y.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 112 (Mckinney 2014); REVISED MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.70, 3.04(b)–(c), 8.10 (a), 14.03–.04 (3d ed. 2008).
6. James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV.
218, 262–63 (2003).
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variety of new models that are a better fit to enforce charitable fiduciary
standards.7
This Comment proposes a self-funded state regulatory organization that
is responsible for charitable oversight and regulation within Louisiana,
replacing the current regulatory system under the attorney general’s office.
No perfect model or answer exists to the problem of properly regulating the
charitable sector; however, this self-funded organization would help ensure
proper regulation of Louisiana’s charitable sector and place authority in a
dedicated enforcement body, whose only task would consist of overseeing
charities.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of charitable organizations
and director fiduciary standards. Part II explains the current model of
enforcement and the problems with the system. Part III discusses various
scholarly proposals for new models of enforcement. And finally, Part IV
explains why a self-funded regulatory organization best ensures proper
oversight of charities and their directors.
I. THE CHARITABLE LANDSCAPE OF LOUISIANA
The provisions governing charitable organizations operating in Louisiana
are placed in Titles 12 and 51 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.8 State law
governs the organization and regulation of charities, and many states enact
such laws to regulate charitable organizations.9 Similar to statutes governing
for-profit corporations,10 these regulations are necessary for charitable
organizations seeking to operate legally in Louisiana.11
A. The Charitable Distinction
An important distinction exists between a nonprofit organization and
a charity. The term “nonprofit” is a state law organizational concept,
making an organization eligible for certain state law tax benefits.12 If an
7. See infra Part III.
8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:201 to :275 (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 51
(2003, 2012, & Supp. 2015).
9. See Fishman, supra note 6, at 222; see also N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP.
LAW § 35; CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5001–10845.
10. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-101 to 1-1704 (containing Louisiana’s
Business Corporation statutes) (Supp. 2015).
11. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 12:203 (setting forth the requirements to form
a nonprofit corporation in Louisiana).
12. Applying for Exemption – Difference Between Nonprofit and Tax-Exempt
Status, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Applying-for-ExemptionDifference-Between-Nonprofit-and-Tax-Exempt-Status [http://perma.cc/CBY3-SU
SM] (last updated Mar. 4, 2015).
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organization forms as a nonprofit at the state level, it will not automatically
receive federal tax exemption status.13 The Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) is responsible for granting tax-exemption status through a set of
requirements that an applying organization must meet.14
Whereas a nonprofit is a state law status, the classification of “charity”
is based on the IRS’s determination that a nonprofit meets specific
requirements for tax-exemption.15 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code states that an organization formed and operated for a
charitable purpose will automatically receive tax-exemption from the
IRS.16 Additionally, the organization cannot benefit private interests, and
net earnings of the organization cannot benefit private individuals.17
B. How is a Charity Formed?
Generally, a charity will form under its state’s nonprofit corporation
act, making it a specific type of nonprofit.18 Charities may also form as
charitable trusts.19 Charitable organizations formed as neither trusts nor
corporations are rare, and the law that applies to those types of
organizations is vague and ambiguous, blurring the line of whether they
truly fall under the definition of a charity.20 In a similar fashion, the law
that applies to charitable organizations is also poorly defined and has
developed slowly in comparison to for-profit corporation law.21
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Types of Tax-Exempt Organizations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities&-Non-Profits/Types-of-Tax-Exempt-Organizations [http://perma.cc/7M76-QV4A]
(last updated Jan. 15, 2015).
16. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). A complete overview and analysis of the taxexempt determination process is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an
overview of this process, see Karen Donnelly, Comment, Good Governance: Has
the IRS Usurped the Business Judgment of Tax-Exempt Organizations in the
Name of Transparency and Accountability?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 163, 169–72
(2010).
17. Exemption Requirements – 501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov
/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exemption-Requirements-Section
-501(c)(3)-Organizations [http://perma.cc/TU9A-738D] (last updated Jan. 8, 2015).
This Comment will refer exclusively to charitable organizations.
18. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 497, 501–02 (1981); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:201 to
12:275 (2010) (containing the Louisiana Nonprofit Corporation Act).
19. Fishman, supra note 6, at 224; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2271
(2009) (detailing trusts formed for charitable purposes).
20. See Hansmann, supra note 18, at 502. This Comment will focus on
charitable organizations formed as either charitable trusts or corporations.
21. Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior,
Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1377 (2003);
see also MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
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C. Distinguishing For-Profits from Charities
Unlike for-profit corporations, where shareholders expect to share in
profits earned by the corporation, owners of charitable organizations are
prohibited from sharing simultaneously in both profits and control.22 In
Louisiana, the law prohibits an organization formed under the Nonprofit
Corporation Law Act from distributing dividends or pecuniary remunerations
to shareholders and also restrains members from retaining the organization’s
earnings.23 Louisiana’s regulations also define a charity as “a [juridical]
person who is or holds himself out to be a benevolent, civic, recreational,
educational, voluntary, health, law enforcement, social service, philanthropic,
fraternal, humane, patriotic, religious, or eleemosynary organization.”24
Charitable organizations are public-benefitting organizations in nature.25
The charitable sector depends on the public’s trust that charities will serve a
public purpose.26 The charitable sector’s commitment to serve the public’s
needs distinguishes these types of organizations from for-profit
organizations.27

19 (2004) (stating that charitable law consists of trust law, corporate codes, federal
and state tax laws, decedents’ estates, and selections from property). Louisiana
recently revised its business corporation statutes in 2014 to be effective January
1, 2015. See Glenn G. Morris, Model Business Corporation Act as Adopted in
Louisiana, 75 LA. L. REV. 983, 983 (2015). The new model is based on the
nationally-recognized Model Business Corporation Act. Id. A revision to the
Nonprofit Corporation Act may also be forthcoming. However, the legislature has
not passed any such revision at this time.
22. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 501.
23. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:210(F) (2010); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:266(1) (2010) (stating that the Nonprofit Corporation Law Act does not
apply to “[a]ny corporation organized for any purpose involving pecuniary profit
or gain to its shareholders or members, or which pays dividends or similar
pecuniary remuneration.”).
24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1901(1) (2010). An eleemosynary organization
is one created for a dedicated charitable purpose or an organization which is
supported by a charity. JAMES S. HOLLIDAY, JR., RICK J. NORMAN & DALE R.
BARINGER, LOUISIANA CORPORATIONS, § 18:3, in 1 LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES
1222 (2014).
25. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the
Twenty-First Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
479, 489 (2010). Louisiana defines charity under the Deceptive Practices in
Soliciting Charitable Organizations chapter to set guidelines for these organizations
in soliciting donors. Id.
26. See id.
27. See Joel L. Fleishman, Public Trust in Not-for-Profit Organizations and
the Need for Regulatory Reform, in PHILANTHROPY AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
IN A CHANGING AMERICA 172, 173 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehrlich eds.,
1999).
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D. Roles of Charitable Officers and Directors
Typically, charities have a self-perpetuating board of directors who
control the organization.28 Charity directors, like for-profit directors, appoint
officers and executives responsible for running the organization on a dayto-day basis.29 The directors of these boards are regarded as fiduciaries.30
The Louisiana Revised Statutes state that officers and directors are
fiduciaries and must act “in good faith, and with that diligence, care,
judgment and skill which ordinary prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions.”31
E. Fiduciary Obligations of Charity Directors
Fiduciary duties are standards of conduct that directors must follow
while serving their organization.32 Specifically, fiduciary duties require
directors to act in a way that furthers the charitable organization’s purpose
and prohibits the directors from making self-benefitting decisions.33
Because charitable organizations serve a public purpose, their directors are
held to a higher standard of fiduciary obligations than their for-profit
counterparts.34 For example, a director acts out his or her fiduciary
obligations by making informed and reasonable decisions that are in the best
interest of the charitable organization.35 If, however, directors continually
miss meetings, make uninformed decisions, or use their positions for
personal benefit, they have likely breached their fiduciary responsibilities.36

28. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 19. A self-perpetuating board of directors
is a system where the out-going directors vote for their own replacements. See Ellis
Carter, Nonprofit Law Jargon Buster – Voting Members vs. Self-Perpetuating Boards,
CHARITY LAW. (Apr. 26, 2011), http://charitylawyerblog.com/2011/04/26/nonprofitlaw-jargon-buster-voting-members-vs-self-perpetuating-boards/ [http://perma.cc/N2H
4-W4VB].
29. See Brent Wilson, Advising and Serving on Non-Profit Boards: No Good
Deed Goes Unpunished, 53 ADVOCATE, no. 9, Sept. 2010, at 39.
30. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 349; see infra Part I.D; see also LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:201(11) (2010) (stating that fiduciary means “any person,
firm, partnership, association or corporation, including a usufructuary, who or
which occupies a position of peculiar confidence toward any person, firm,
association, partnership, trust or estate”).
31. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:226(A).
32. See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 355.
33. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 187.
34. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 397.
35. JACK B. SIEGEL, A DESKTOP GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS,
OFFICERS, AND ADVISORS 80 (2006).
36. Id.
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These examples of fiduciary duties translate into two main obligations: the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.37
1. The Duty of Care
The duty of care requires a director’s actions to be the same as that of
a normal, prudent person acting in a like position.38 A director properly
satisfies the duty of care by keeping informed of organizational activities,
remaining attentive to the organization’s operations, and making decisions
that are in the best interest of the organization.39 In the charitable context,
directors must follow the duty of care when investing charitable assets and
engaging in activities following the organization’s charitable mission.40
Directors have a wide range of latitude in exercising control; however,
they are still required to make informed decisions with proper judgment.41
For example, a breach of the duty of care occurs when a director uses
dedicated charitable funds against a donor’s wishes.42
The business judgment rule shields directors from liability for
violating the duty of care if the director has acted as an ordinarily prudent
administrator would under like circumstances.43 Essentially, the business
judgment rule is meant to protect directors from liability if they make
informed business decisions.44 Courts apply the business judgment rule
because judges do not view their role as second guessing director decisions
and holding directors liable for well-intentioned decisions that turned out
poorly.45
A real-life example of a breach of the duty of care occurred when
directors of the Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation

37. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 355. A third duty, the duty of obedience,
is often included, but the most commonly accepted duties are the duties of care
and loyalty. Id. at 388. The duty of obedience captures the idea that a director is
under an obligation to ensure that the corporation is acting within its stated
purpose and mission. Id. The duty of obedience is a reflection of the age-old ultra
vires doctrine that prohibits corporate acts that go beyond the corporation’s
mission and purpose. Id.
38. Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV.
1400, 1420 (1998).
39. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 375.
40. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 433.
41. Id.
42. See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 375–79.
43. Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, Revisiting the Duty of Care
of the Nonprofit Director, 36 J. HEALTH L. 183, 189–90 (2003).
44. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 376–77.
45. Id.
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(“AHERF”) used restricted funds to repay bank loans.46 AHERF liquidated
money from endowment funds to pay back a bank loan of around $89
million.47 The Pennsylvania Attorney General arrested three of the directors
at AHERF and brought criminal charges for illegally spending money out
of charitable endowment funds.48 This example sheds light on to just one
example of directors who breach the duty of care and who attempt to hide
behind the business judgment rule.
2. The Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty requires board members to place personal interests
behind those of the charity and its mission49 and sets standards for
situations where a director has a conflict of interest.50 Under the duty of
loyalty, directors are prohibited from completing self-dealing transactions
that benefit themselves over the organization.51 A director can breach the
duty of loyalty by disclosing confidential information, usurping a business
opportunity from the charity, unlawfully distributing charitable assets, or
using organizational funds for improper purposes.52 A common example
of a director breaching the duty of loyalty is “a director who serves on the
boards of two charities that are looking for major gifts from a specific
donor or are interested in purchasing a specific parcel of real estate.”53
Examples of directors breaching their duty of loyalty are more
prevalent than breaches of the duty of care. Another real life example is
Oral Suer, a former director at the United Way of the National Capital

46. Josh Goldstein & Karl Stark, Allegheny Chief Ordered Fund Switch the
Health System Used Restricted Money to Repay an $89 Million Bank Loan,
PHILLY.COM (Dec. 9, 1998), http://articles.philly.com/1998-12-09/news/25720088
_1_allegheny-officials-allegheny-health-education-aherf [http://perma.cc/R8UJ-D
W3C].
47. Id.
48. Pennsylvania Attorney General Fisher Announces Arrests of Three
AHERF Officers; Trio Charged with Illegally Spending $52 Million in Charitable
Funds, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 15, 1998), http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/pennsylvania-attorney-general-fisher-announces-arrests-of-three-aherf-of
ficers-trio-charged-with-illegally-spending-52-million-in-charitable-funds-731058
92.html [http://perma.cc/XA4N-4L3Y].
49. Christyne J. Vachon, Blurring. Not Fading. Looking at the Duties of Care
and Loyalty as Nonprofits Move into Commercialism, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN.
J. BUS. L. 37, 48 (2011).
50. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 381.
51. Id. at 381–82.
52. See Vachon, supra note 49, at 49.
53. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 436.

2015]

COMMENT

669

Area in Washington D.C.54 Suer defrauded the charity of roughly
$500,000 for personal benefit.55 A federal court forced Suer to pay
$497,000 in restitution and serve the maximum sentence of 27 months in
prison.56 When directors breach these duties, the harmful impact extends
beyond the charity and affects the public and the charity’s intended
beneficiaries.
II. OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT CHARITABLE
ENFORCEMENT MODEL
The oversight of charitable organizations is crucial because charities
exist to provide a public benefit.57 Commenting on the state of charitable
oversight, Professor Terri Lynn Helge has stated: “Substantial reform in
the regulation of charitable organizations is necessary to curb the reported
abuses that have undermined confidence in the charitable sector.”58
Effective regulation of the charitable sector warrants proper oversight that
assures the public that these organizations are following an accepted set of
standards by which society has agreed these entities should abide.59
A. The Need for Proper Oversight in the Charitable Sector
A major reason why the government and the general public allow taxexempt organizations to exist is because the organizations serve their
community in some way.60 When charities abuse their privileges, the public
will lose faith in the entire sector.61 Wrongdoing in the charitable sector is
due in part to the lack of standardization of good governance principals and
improper or insufficient oversight from enforcement officials.62
Scandals at large charitable organizations further demonstrate this
problem and the need for charitable oversight reform. In the aftermath of
the September 11 terrorist attacks, the American Red Cross used donations
for purposes other than victim support, sparking controversy in the media
54. Jerry Markon, Ex-Chief of Local United Way Sentenced, WASH. POST (May
15, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27261-2004May14
.html [http://perma.cc/5Z2W-Z9DE].
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Fishman, supra note 6, at 255–56.
58. Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable
Sector Through a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 1 (2009).
59. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 489.
60. See Fishman, supra note 6, at 220.
61. Id.
62. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 362.
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and public.63 Another example is a board member at the Smithsonian
Institute who resigned amid allegations of excessive salaries, enormous
expense accounts, and personal trips funded by the museum in 2007.64
Classifying scandals in the charitable sector as outliers is tempting.65
Some truth to this idea may exist, as the precise extent of wrongdoing in
the charitable sector is difficult to determine.66 These examples are not
alone, as there are many more cases of indecency both reported and
unreported.67 Scandals such as these illustrate the fact that the problem
extends beyond isolated incidents and the need for reform across the
charitable spectrum.
B. Director and Organization Accountability in Different Business
Sectors
In comparison to the charitable sector, the for-profit sector has more
means of accountability and greater oversight of organizations and
directors.68 During the past decade, the federal government has reformed
for-profit corporate governance and heightened the accountability
standards of corporate directors.69
The traditional corporate accountability model relies on oversight
from the company’s shareholders.70 Shareholders have standing to bring
suit against directors and officers of the corporation for violations of
63. See Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward
Decay, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 20–21 (2011) (stating that “the fallout was
considerable, and contributed to an erosion of confidence in charities, later
reinforced by continuing press reports of scandals in the sector”).
64. Jacqueline Trescott & James V. Grimaldi, Smithsonian’s Small Quits in
Wake of Inquiry, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2007, at A1.
65. See Colinvaux, supra note 63, at 19.
66. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 13–14. The author cites a study
of nonprofit corruption between 1995 and 2002 that showed 152 instances of
nonprofit directors accused of either criminal or civil wrongdoing. Id. Yet, at the
same time there were an estimated 1.4 million nonprofit organizations operating
in the United States. Id. This data most likely suggests serious underreporting and
a lack of oversight in the sector as a whole. Id.
67. See Charity Watch Hall of Shame, CHARITY WATCH, https://www
.charitywatch.org/charitywatch-articles/charitywatch-hall-of-shame/63 [https://perma
.cc/GZ7D-9J2F] (last visited Sept. 21, 2015) (chronicling charity directors involved in
major charity scandals throughout the 21st century).
68. See generally Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 358–60 (describing the
increased reforms that have taken place in corporate governance).
69. Id. at 357.
70. ELIZABETH SARAH GERE, PAUL C. VITRANO & STEPHANIE T. SCHMELZ,
BE PREPARED: NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS’ LEGAL RISKS AND PROTECTIONS 10
(2005), available at http://www.altru.com/resources/Altru_LiabilityExposure
Update.pdf [http://perma.cc/79CD-GWBS].
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fiduciary obligations.71 These suits, called derivative actions, can be an
effective tool to hold directors accountable in situations of director selfdealing and other instances of breaches of the duty of loyalty.72
The Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) also plays a role in governing for-profit corporations.
The SEC seeks to monitor “[c]ompanies offering securities for sale to the
public[,] . . . the securities they are selling, and the risks involved in investing
in those securities.”73 The primary function of SEC oversight is to
“regulat[e] brokers, investment advisors, mutual funds, and market
operators.”74 The enforcement staff, composed of roughly 250 attorneys and
other professionals, conduct informal and formal inquiries into possible
securities violations and if violations are discovered, the attorneys impose
sanctions on the transgressor.75 Federal securities law allows the SEC to
institute injunctive proceedings, civil penalties or fines, cease-and-desist
orders, or proceedings directly against securities professionals.76
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,77 which Congress passed in hopes
of building public confidence in corporations and to provide better
oversight of these organizations, is another tool for overseeing for-profit
corporations.78 The Act initiated various governance reforms in the
corporate sphere.79 Congress limited the Act to for-profit corporations,
however, and it is not applicable to charitable organizations.80
Another model used to protect the public from for-profit director duty
breaches is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).81
FINRA is a government-authorized nonprofit organization dedicated to

71. Id.
72. Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability
Within the Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 214 (2010).
73. U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV,
http://investor.gov/introduction-markets/role-sec#.VFFhH_nF98E [http://perma.cc
/42ZB-LVNE] (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
74. Peter J. Henning, Should the SEC Spin Off the Enforcement Division?, 11
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 121, 123 (2009).
75. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Philip S. Khinda, SEC Enforcement Proceedings:
Strategic Considerations for When the Agency Comes Calling, 51 ADMIN. L. REV.
1143, 1145 (1999).
76. Id. at 1173.
77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
78. Eric M. Fogel, David I. Addis & Edward C. Harris, Public Company
Shareholders Acting as Owners: Three Reforms—Introducing the “Oversight
Shareholder”, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517, 519 (2004).
79. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 358.
80. Id.
81. About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ [http://perma.cc
/TKN9-7DT7] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
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ensuring that the securities industry operates correctly and honestly.82
FINRA regulates all securities firms who conduct business with the public,
overseeing approximately 633,000 registered security representatives.83
FINRA enforces federal securities laws, its own set of standards, and rules
that the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board has put in place.84 FINRA
is also authorized to discipline securities dealers who violate regulations
by leveling fines and barring brokers from the securities industry.85
Overall, there is much more oversight of for-profit, public
organizations than charitable organizations because the public is more
financially invested in for-profit organizations, and misdoings in the forprofit sector have a broad range of consequences for the public.86 While
the government has taken a proactive role in regulating for-profit
corporations, changes to the charitable regulation scheme have been slow
to develop.
C. Charitable Enforcement through the State Attorney General
In most states, the attorney general supervises the charitable sector by
monitoring funds donated to public charities and preventing these charities
from misappropriating donated funds.87 The attorney general acts as the
representative of charity beneficiaries and donors of charitable
organizations in this way.88 State attorneys general have the exclusive

82. Id.
83. Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory
Organization’s Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV.
963, 968–69 (2012).
84. What We Do, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/WhatWeDo/
[http://perma.cc/FMJ4-YB24] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
85. Id.
86. Reforms of for-profit corporate governance took place in part because of
corporate fraud during the Enron era and the financial collapse of 2008. Hazen &
Hazen, supra note 1, at 358. These events caused public and governmental
concern over corporate governance policies and the duties of corporate directors.
Id. The majority of the reforms mentioned above, however, were limited to
publicly traded, for-profit corporations. Id.
87. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 305–06. The state attorney general is
an external enforcer of charitable organizations, but scholars have suggested a
number of internal actions charitable organizations should take to avoid liability.
SIEGEL, supra note 35, at 491–600. These internal controls provide oversight to
help directors and managers avoid operational liabilities. Internal controls are a
first defense against director and organizational misconduct. A complete
discussion of these controls is outside the scope of this Comment. For an overview
of a charity’s internal controls, see id.
88. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 443.
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authority to enforce fiduciary obligations in most states and proper
oversight of the charitable sector falls firmly on their shoulders.89
State attorneys general’s offices require charities to register with their
office, file annual informational reports, and provide copies of federal
informational returns and audited financial statements.90 Attorneys general
can then file suit against these organizations to correct violations of
charitable law,91 and have the power to remove directors, dissolve violating
organizations, or request an accounting of charitable assets.92 In most states,
the attorney general is also responsible for charitable solicitation “to protect
. . . donors from deceptive and fraudulent solicitation practices or diversion
or waste of donated funds.”93 However, one drawback is the fact that
attorneys general do not have the power to monitor charities in their day-today operations.94
D. Regulation of Charities through the IRS
The IRS is responsible for enforcing federal tax law on charitable
organizations.95 In 2004, amidst ongoing scandals in the charitable sector,96
Mark W. Everson, the then-commissioner of the IRS, testified in front of the
U.S. Senate Finance Committee about the IRS’s plans to implement more
thorough oversight of the sector.97 Commissioner Everson spoke about the
problems in the sector including ethical violations, the lack of internal
oversight measures, and conflicts of interest among directors.98 In light of
these problems, Commissioner Everson proposed a plan to increase
oversight of charitable organizations that included imposing penalties on
violating organizations and increased review of the Form 990.99 The Form
990 is an annual reporting form that all charitable organizations must file
with the IRS,100 mirroring an audited financial statement.101 Commissioner
Everson stated that the IRS was going to switch from a passive to active role

89. Helge, supra note 58, at 13.
90. Id. at 14. Charitable organizations may be required to have an audited
financial statement prepared by a certified public accountant. Donnelly, supra
note 16, at 170.
91. Fishman, supra note 6, at 260.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 261–62.
94. Id. at 262.
95. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 498.
96. See supra Part II.B.
97. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 179.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 165.
101. Fishman, supra note 6, at 241.
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to prevent charitable organization scandals from unfolding, stating that
continued abuse “would no longer be tolerated.”102
The Form 990 was recently revised with a new version released for
filings beginning in 2009.103 The new form poses questions designed to
elicit the policies and practices in place of the filing charity’s governance
structure.104 The revised form also aims to increase transparency of
director compensation and involvement.105 The filing of the Form 990
must include “the process by which the officers, directors, trustees, or
management reviewed the form, whether the form was reviewed before it
was filed with the IRS, who conducted the review, when it was conducted,
and the extent of the review.”106 A new section titled “Governance,
Management, and Disclosure” requires detailed answers about the
charity’s governing board and management practices.107
Noncompliance with the items in the new Form 990 “will, at a
minimum, raise a red flag and could trigger an investigation or an audit
risk.”108 The ultimate penalty that an organization can receive for violating
IRS regulations is the loss of tax-exempt status.109 No federal law grants
the IRS the power to regulate charitable governance, however; charities
have the right to reject IRS recommendations.110 The Form 990 disclosures
do not specifically require that charities follow a set of good governance
standards; however, they are “designed to strongly encourage
transparency and accountability.”111 Additionally, as one commentator
noted, “the questions asked on the new form will not necessarily reflect
the effectiveness or the efficiency with which a board of any size
operates.”112

102. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 179–180.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 181.
105. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 367–68 (“The Form 990 must also
indicate whether the process for determining the compensation for the CEO, key
officers and key employees included a review and approval by independent
persons, consideration of compensation data for comparable positions at similar
organizations, and contemporaneous documentation of deliberations and
decisions regarding compensation.”).
106. Id. at 367.
107. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 183.
108. Id. at 188.
109. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 368.
110. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 188.
111. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 397.
112. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 184.
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E. Watchdog Oversight of the Charitable Sector
Independent watchdog organizations also monitor and provide oversight
of the charitable sector.113 Watchdog organizations use a system of
evaluations and ratings based on charities’ public 990 filings.114 Watchdog
focus groups typically use a rating system to evaluate how a particular charity
uses donor funds.115 Watchdog organizations can give lower grades based on
a charity’s reporting, which may “cause donors to look past that particular
charity in favor of other, higher-ranking organizations.”116
These organizations serve an important part in enforcing fiduciary
standards, but they are no substitute for official enforcement procedures that
hold charities accountable.117 Charities have no obligation to report to these
organizations and their oversight is limited to informal investigations and
whatever information can be discerned from a charity’s Form 990.
F. Charitable Enforcement in Louisiana
In Louisiana, the Office of the Attorney General is responsible for
monitoring and assisting charitable organizations operating in the state,
although there is no express statutory authority granting this responsibility.118
The only writing that delegates or references the Attorney General’s duty to
oversee charitable organizations is found on their official website, which
states that it will “assist [donors] with how to make a wise charitable
donation and . . . assist charitable organizations . . . with their legal
obligations”119
Title 51 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes holds the Trade and
Commerce protection statutes in Louisiana.120 Chapter 24, the Deceptive
Practices in Soliciting Charitable Contributions section, gives the Louisiana
Attorney General the power to prosecute charitable organizations that
“engage in unfair methods of competition, unfair or deceptive practices, or
113. Id. at 167.
114. Id.
115. Helge, supra note 58, at 61–62; see also Criteria & Methodology,
CHARITY WATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/charitywatch-criteria-method
ology [perma.cc/6GZH-GTDF] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (providing an
overview of how Charity Watch, a charitable watchdog organization, rates and
grades charities based on different criteria and factors).
116. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 191.
117. See Fleishman, supra note 27, at 185.
118. Charities, OFF. ATT’Y GEN. STATE LA., https://www.ag.state.la.us/Article
.aspx?articleID=3&catID=0 [https://perma.cc/P3DM-A9N6] (last visited Sept. 2,
2015).
119. Id.
120. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51 (2012).
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misrepresentation.”121 The Consumer Protection Section (“CPS”) of the
attorney general’s office issues Civil Investigative Demands (“CIDs”)
against charities suspected of engaging in prohibited practices.122 Based on
information obtained through a CID, the CPS will decide whether to take
disciplinary actions against the alleged wrongdoer. Though the attorney
general may file suit, the majority of proceedings filed against charitable
organizations are settled before charges are even filed.123
G. Limitations and Restrictions on the State Attorney General’s
Oversight in the Charitable Sector
State attorneys general face severe limitations that prevent them from
proper oversight of the charitable sector.124 Enforcement through the
attorney general’s office is limited, particularly in correcting violations of
duties of care and loyalty and ensuring that charitable funds are properly
allocated.125
Many attorney general offices face staffing problems and inadequate
funding, which complicates enforcement efforts.126 A survey conducted in
2007 revealed that 74% of states had only one or fewer full-time attorneys
dedicated to charitable oversight, even as the number of charitable
organizations has more than doubled in the past 15 years.127 This lack of

121. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1905(A) (2012). The entire section states:
It shall be unlawful for any charitable organization, solicitor therefor, or
person owning, managing, directing, representing, or acting as agent for any
charitable organization, an organization soliciting contributions for any
charitable organization, or an organization claiming to sell merchandise,
products, goods, or services for charitable purposes to engage in unfair
methods of competition, unfair or deceptive practices, or misrepresentation.
Id.
122. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1411 (Supp. 2015). A CID is a written request for
information from an attorney general’s office. Peter A. Nolan, Yes, You Do Need to
Respond to Civil Investigative Demands, METRO. CORP. COUNS. (Sept. 1, 2007),
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/8820/yes-you-do-need-respond-civil-in
vestigative-demands [http://perma.cc/PC59-XYTD]. The purpose of a CID is to
collect information in a similar fashion to the pre-trial discovery phase. Id. The state
attorney general uses CIDs to gather information pursuant to an investigation of
alleged wrongdoing. Id.
123. See generally FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 446 (stating that
attorneys general have increasingly used the threat of litigation to make charities
agree to settlements).
124. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 402–03.
125. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 443.
126. Id. at 445.
127. Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of
Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1128 (2007); Number of Nonprofit
Organizations in the United States, 1999–2009, NCCS, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org
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staffing and resources also contributes to a lack of information flowing
from oversight officials to legislatures considering new laws.128 Attorney
general offices are also self-sustaining through administrative fees,
legislative appropriations, and fines and settlement awards collected from
violating organizations. 129 Louisiana’s registration fee is relatively low at
$25 per year, as compared to other states’ registration scaled fee systems
based on the charity’s size and contributions made to the organization.130
California, for instance, has a scaling registration fee between $25 and
$300, depending on the organization’s revenue.131
Another major impediment to attorney general oversight is the
politicization of attorney general offices.132 Because attorneys general are
elected officials, scholars have criticized their enforcement efforts for
being politically biased.133 For example, state attorneys general have
occasionally attempted to block the relocation of charities to keep
donations within their state.134 State attorneys general may be reluctant “to
move in an aggressive and timely fashion when to do so might be
politically difficult—despite abundant grounds for concern about damage
to the public interest.”135
Centralization and standardization is another obstacle in holding
charities accountable. This problem is partially due to the excessive
/PubApps/profile1.php?state=US [http://perma.cc/U7HA-WAPA] (last visited Sept.
1, 2015).
128. Jenkins, supra note 127, at 1129–30.
129. Fishman, supra note 6, at 263.
130. Charitable Registrations, LA. DEP’T JUSTICE OFFICE ATT’Y GEN., https:
//www.ag.state.la.us/Shared/ViewDoc.aspx?Type=3&Doc=396 [https://perma.cc/Q
FK9-ZKJW] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
131. See Office of the Att’y Gen., New Charity Registration Requirements and
Fees, STATE CAL. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://oag.ca.gov/charities/content/reg_req [http:
//perma.cc/8LR5-NBS4] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015); N.J. Div. of Consumer Affairs,
Charities Registration Section, S TATE N.J., http://www.njconsumeraffairs
.gov/charities/Pages/registration.aspx [http://perma.cc/DP47-HPV5] (last updated
Apr. 9, 2015, 8:48 AM) (having fees ranging from $60 to $250, depending on gross
contributions); Or. Dep’t of Justice, Form CT-12F (2014), available at
http://www.doj.state.or.us/charigroup/pdf/2014_web_ct-12f.pdf [http://perma.cc
/A9PH-459K] (fees ranging from $10 to $200 dependent on annual revenue); N.Y.
Office of the Att’y Gen., Form CHAR500 (2014), available at http://www
.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/CHAR500_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/69NT-AZ9A]
(annual registration fees ranging from $0 to $1500 dependent on the organization’s
net worth).
132. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 446.
133. See Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 494 (suggesting that an attorney
general’s motivation for enforcing fiduciary standards could be political rather
than effective enforcement concerns).
134. Id. at 548.
135. Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
613, 617 (2005).
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number of regulators who all have different methods and levels of
enforcement.136 Scholars have noted “the increasing overlap in enforcement
jurisdictions of the state attorneys general and the IRS” have resulted in
“inefficiencies in the regulation of the [charitable] sector.”137 The result has
been a “pass-the-ball” game in which both entities believe the other one will
handle regulation, which results in no enforcement at all.138
Another challenge facing Louisiana’s attorney general oversight is the
fact that only charities using professional solicitors are required to register
with the office.139 The Louisiana Attorney General does not keep records of
charities operating in the state that do not use professional solicitors.140 State
attorneys general cannot properly regulate charities if they records of their
operation do not exist.141
H. Standing to Sue in the Charitable Arena
In addition to the lack of proper oversight, standing challenges often
complicate suits to enforce director fiduciary obligations.142 In for-profit
corporations, shareholders have standing to bring suit against directors and
officers for violating their fiduciary obligations.143 Charitable organizations,
on the other hand, do not have shareholders; thus, only a limited number of
persons have standing to bring suits directly against directors for violations.144
Courts have found that only fellow officers and directors, state attorneys
general, and individuals with special relationships to the charity have standing
to sue.145 Complicating the standing issue is the fact that many courts have set
high standing requirements for persons to sue in the charitable sector.146
In Louisiana, however, no restrictions prevent a charitable corporation
from having shareholders; the restrictions only prohibit corporations from
distributing profits or earnings to these shareholders.147 Yet no decisions
136. See generally Helge, supra note 58, at 79–80 (stating the inefficiencies
resulting from multiple regulatory enforcement powers).
137. Id. at 79.
138. Id. at 80.
139. Charities, supra note 118. A professional solicitor is “any person who, for
financial consideration, solicits contributions for or on behalf of a charitable
organization, whether such solicitation is performed personally or through agents,
servants, or employees or through agents engaged in the solicitation of contributions
under the directions of such person.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1901(6) (2012).
140. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 444.
141. Id. at 445.
142. GERE ET AL., supra note 70.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:201 (2010).
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have been reported in Louisiana of a shareholder bringing a derivative suit
against a charity’s directors, and courts have not declared whether the
shareholder would have standing in this situation. As demonstrated, there
are a plethora of challenges facing regulation of the charitable sector.
There are many scholars that recognize that a change is needed, but the
debate is ongoing as to which solution is the best to effectuate that change.
III. SCHOLARLY PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT TO OVERSIGHT
Commentators have long criticized attorneys general as ill equipped
to properly monitor charitable organizations.148 Often, rumors will
circulate of alleged wrongdoing without a formal investigation from the
attorney general office.149 Scholars have criticized this enforcement model
for over 50 years and have proposed a variety of new models that better
ensure oversight of the charitable sector.150
A. New State Agency
Professor Kenneth L. Karst gave one of the first proposals for change
in charitable oversight in the 1960s.151 He suggested a new state agency
responsible “for supervising private charities and for administering the
various state controls over their operations.”152 Under this proposal, each
state would have its own independent agency responsible for charitable
oversight and enforcing fiduciary obligations of directors.153 The agency
would collect periodic reports from charitable organizations to provide
transparency of organizations operating in its state.154 Professor Karst
believed that a new agency was advantageous as compared to the current
model because it would create a unified central administration system of
the charitable sector and also include experts, such as accountants,
specifically trained to audit and investigate charities.155 Professor Karst
thought that directors and managers of charitable organizations would also
148. Fleishman, supra note 27, at 185–86.
149. Id. at 187.
150. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An
Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1960) (proposing a new
model of charitable fiduciary enforcement in 1960); see also Mayer & Wilson,
supra note 25, at 494 (finding that for more than 50 years scholars have expressed
concerns over the current enforcement model).
151. Karst, supra note 150, at 476.
152. Id.
153. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 496.
154. See Karst, supra note 150, at 476–77 (listing the functions of the new
proposed charitable accountability agency).
155. Id. at 477.
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benefit from this system because the system would standardize reporting
and oversight under one state agency.156 He also believed that a unified
agency would have the capacity to provide assessments of the charitable
landscape to make proposals to the state’s legislature for new regulations.157
Issues with forming a new state agency to regulate the charitable sector
do exist, however. One issue is state hesitation of withdrawing charitable
oversight from state attorneys general and handing such a task over to a new,
inexperienced agency.158 Further, state budgetary constraints would likely
make this option almost impossible to implement.159 Many states struggle
with budgetary constraints and the public may see a new agency as an
improper use of state funds when there is already an oversight system in
place.160 Another issue is coordinating the new state agency with other states
and the federal regulatory agencies responsible for charitable oversight.161
B. State Charity Commission Working in Conjunction with the State
Attorney General
In 2003, Professor James Fishman proposed a state charity commission
to regulate a state’s charitable sector that would work in conjunction with
the state’s attorney general.162 Under this model, an assistant from the
attorney general’s office would manage a delegation of 15 people—7
appointed by the state attorney general and 8 appointed by the governor—
responsible for oversight of the state’s charitable organizations.163 The
commission would have exclusive authority over the charitable sector,
including the power to investigate complaints made against organizations.164
Under the new model, when a complaint is filed against a charity, a panel
consisting of three randomly selected commissioners would investigate the
complaint and, if validated, serve a copy of the complaint on the charity.165
The panel would have the authority to settle or resolve the issue or, if

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 518–19 (finding that a new state
agency could result in governmental waste because the state attorneys general’s
offices already have experience in the area in every state).
159. For an understanding of state budgetary constraints, see Janet Loehrke et
al., Best- and Worst-Run States: Survey of All 50, USA TODAY (Nov. 23, 2013, 2:39
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/11/22/best-worst-runstates/3671359/ [http://perma.cc/Y8G5-NZPT].
160. See id.
161. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 541–45.
162. Fishman, supra note 6, at 272.
163. Id. at 272–73.
164. Id. at 273–74.
165. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 497.
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necessary, bring the matter in front of the entire commission for review.166
Professor Fishman argued that this system would strengthen oversight of
the sector because the commission would be a remedial body capable of
correcting fiduciary behavior.167 He also believed that the new system
would keep citizens interested in charitable oversight.168
The aforementioned problems with oversight by the attorney general,
such as politicization, would likely also be present in a commission having
strong ties to the office, however.169 Another issue would arise if some
states adopted the proposal and others did not.170 Budgetary constraints
could also affect this model because no reason exists to believe that a new
state commission would receive any more funding than the attorney
general’s office.171
C. Federal Regulatory Commission
In 1999, Professor Joel Fleishman proposed a federal regulatory agency,
called the U.S. Charities Regulatory Commission, which would be
responsible for regulating and overseeing charitable organizations.172 Under
this model, the President would appoint commissioners responsible for
regulating all nonprofit organizations.173 Professor Fleishman believed the
commission could model the Federal Trade Commission or the Securities and
Exchange Commission.174 The commission would handle investigations of
alleged fiduciary breaches and also have the power to commence civil or
criminal proceedings when violations were discovered.175 Further, the new
commission would “be empowered to investigate instances of wrongdoing,
subpoena witnesses, and institute civil or criminal proceedings on its own
motion.”176 The IRS would remain in charge of all tax-related issues, but work
in conjunction with the commission to regulate the sector.177 This approach
would allow the IRS to focus on enforcing federal tax law and leave the new
commission to monitor wrongdoing in the charitable sector.178 Professor
166. Id.
167. Fishman, supra note 6, at 273.
168. Id.
169. See supra Part II.A.
170. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 520. The concern is that charities
operating in more than one state would face different rules and regulations in each
state. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 498–99.
173. Fleishman, supra note 27, at 189.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 499.
177. Fleishman, supra note 27, at 189.
178. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 499.
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Fleishman also suggested that that the commission should defer to state
enforcement procedures to promote comity and a working relationship
between the new commission and state enforcement officials.179
Even Professor Fleishman acknowledged, however, that mass
reorganization and drastic changes to regulation of the nonprofit sector should
not be the first solution.180 He believed it should be a last resort, as charitable
organizations would face significant changes and transition costs.181 Another
issue facing a new federal commission is the fact that Congress cannot compel
a state to adopt a federally enforced set of fiduciary standards.182 Professor
Fleishman also worried about the commission’s effectiveness in the face of
political partisanship or a lack of funding.183
D. Exclusive Regulation by the IRS
Several scholars and government officials have suggested that the IRS
would be the perfect organization to regulate the entire charitable sector.184
Specifically, former Congresswoman Bonnie S. Brier suggested that the
IRS could develop a list of recommended good governance standards that
charitable organizations should adopt.185 Congresswoman Brier believed
that organizations would automatically adopt these standards to retain taxexempt status.186 Additionally, Congress could empower the IRS to
condition tax-exemption status on an organization following fiduciary

179. Fleishman, supra note 27, at 190–91.
180. Id. at 186–87. Fleishman actually proposed three options and stated of the
federal agency: “The third strategy—a new federal agency—is a strategy of last
resort, which should be pursued only after it became clear that, for whatever
reason, the two prior strategies cannot be made to work.” Id. at 187. Professor
Fleishman’s first proposal was for a non-governmental accountability agency. Id.
at 186–87. His second proposal was for a joint nonprofit–governmental run
agency. Id. at 187.
181. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 521.
182. Id. at 522; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)
(holding that the federal government cannot compel states to institute a federal
regulatory agency). The federal government, however, uses incentives, such as
funding, to entice states into adopting standards and programs that they create. Id.
at 166.
183. Fleishman, supra note 27, at 190.
184. See Bonnie S. Brier et al., The Appropriate Role of the Internal Revenue
Service with Respect to Tax-Exempt Organization Good Governance Issues, in
ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT AND GOV’T ENTITIES (ACT), REPORT OF
RECOMMENDATIONS (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tege
_act_rpt7.pdf [http://perma.cc/D2MN-XBTD]; FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21,
at 465–66.
185. See id. at 175.
186. Id.
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standards.187 Further, scholars have suggested giving the IRS the power to
remove fiduciaries they find unfit to serve as leaders of charitable
organizations.188 In this sense, the IRS could possibly work with Congress
to provide a single set of federal standards that all nonprofits across the
United States would have to follow.189
Uncertainty persists, however, in allowing the IRS to take on this
additional responsibility. The IRS lacks, and has only slowly developed,
experience in charitable governance.190 Further, the IRS may not be
proficient in deciding whether a set of governance standards will actually
“improve compliance with fiduciary duties by charity leaders.”191 Another
concern is how coordination would take place between the IRS and state
oversight.192 The recent scandals uncovered at the IRS may also bring
hesitation from Congress and the American people to hand over more
power to the IRS.193
E. Expanding Standing in Charitable Director Suits
In 1999, Professor Geoffrey Manne argued that expanding standing to
private actors could help regulate the sector more effectively than
government regulation.194 Professor Manne argued for creating private, forprofit organizations that would monitor charities and bring suits against
violators, with the expectation that these monitoring organizations would
successfully curb charitable and director actions to meet fiduciary
obligations.195 New legislation would require all charitable organizations to
contract with one of these organizations to monitor their charitable
operations.196 The contract would give the monitoring organization the right
187. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 524.
188. See Marion R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of
Nonprofit Organizations: Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for Change,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 643 (2007) (suggesting that expanded IRS oversight
could include the power to remove fiduciaries).
189. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 522.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 523.
192. See id. at 524 ( “Would the IRS have to go to state court to determine if a
fiduciary duty violation had occurred? What happens if the IRS on its own
determines such a violation has occurred but a later state court or [attorney
general] decision says it had not?”).
193. See generally IRS Tea Party Scandal, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huf
fingtonpost.com/news/irs-tea-party-scandal/ [http://perma.cc/CCT5-97WL] (last
visited Sept. 1, 2015) (containing articles related to the IRS Tea Party scandal).
194. Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable
Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227, 253.
195. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 502.
196. Id.
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to sue the charity for violating its charitable mission or in situations where
directors have breached their fiduciary obligations.197 Professor Manne
argued that this model would improve accountability within the sector
without subjecting charitable organizations to frivolous public lawsuits,
while also reducing government oversight costs.198
Concern over the financial incentives and enforcement motivations of
the new oversight organizations would likely arise. Many charitable
organizations could simply choose to refrain from entering a relationship
with a monitoring company because of budget constraints.199 The
monitoring companies may avoid proper oversight to retain more charities
as clients.200 Without proper oversight of the newly created monitoring
companies, the risk of collusion between the monitoring company and a
charity could be unchecked.201
F. Self-Regulatory Organization
Marcus Owens, a former director of the IRS’s Exempt Organizations
Division, proposed a unique model of charitable oversight where a selfregulatory organization would be responsible for charitable corporate
governance oversight.202 The “organization would have the authority to
promulgate rules applicable to charitable organizations[,] . . . process
applications for exemptions, and conduct oversight of the charitable sector
through examinations.”203 Owens’ proposal would be modeled after the SEC
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”).204 He believed
that Congress could charter the tax-exempt oversight organization with
funding coming from the excise tax levied against charitable organizations.205
As a condition for receiving tax-exempt status from the IRS, the organization
would be required to register under the new oversight board for monitoring.206

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Helge, supra note 58, at 52.
200. See Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 529 (suggesting that “contract
[companies] would try to maximize current profits by going easy on their charity
clients, especially if by doing so they could increase their revenues either by
attracting more clients or providing other fee-based services”).
201. Helge, supra note 58, at 51.
202. Id. at 69.
203. Id.
204. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 503. NASD is now called the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. Id.
205. Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight: An Alternative Approach 11–12
(Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 33.4, 2006).
206. Helge, supra note 58, at 71.
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There are several theories as to how the charitable sector should be
overseen, but there is one general consensus—it must be reformed. Although
no solution may be perfect, some reformation is better than the current model.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A STATE SELF-REGULATORY NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATION
Though scholars have proposed a variety of solutions to the problem of
charitable oversight, all of the solutions have flaws. This Comment proposes a
self-funded state regulatory organization, called the Louisiana Charitable
Regulatory Organization (“LCRO”), responsible for regulating charitable
organizations. The LCRO’s self-funded model would place minimal reliance
on the state government and avoid funding deficits, government interference,
politicization, and a lack of accountability within the sector.
A. The LCRO’s Structure, Responsibilities, and Model for Enforcement
A proper structure to the LCRO is critical to its functioning. A state
legislative committee would charter the LCRO and appoint members to its
executive body.207 Members of this executive board could potentially include
donors and beneficiaries of the charitable sector, former staff of the attorney
general’s office, and current or former directors from charities.208 This
executive governing body would be responsible for conducting investigations,
handing out penalties against violating organizations, and reporting to the state
committee. LCRO employees would handle investigative procedures and
bring charges against violating organizations to the LCRO board.
The LCRO would regulate all charitable formation and organization. Any
organization seeking to form as a charity, and specifically as a charitable
organization, within the state would first apply to the LCRO for approval
before commencing operations in the state. The LCRO would have exclusive
control to grant approval to applicants and also control organizations’ taxexempt status within the state.209

207. See id. at 70 (describing how a similar federal oversight body would be
structured and operate).
208. Id. at 71.
209. Existing organizations could be grandfathered in and would not have to seek
approval to form once the LCRO began operating. This process would most likely
include short forms for the charities to fill out and file with LCRO. Currently,
charitable organizations receiving tax-exempt status from the IRS automatically
receive tax-exempt status in Louisiana by submitting a copy of the ruling of exemption
from the IRS. Corporation Income & Franchise Taxes, LA. DEP’T REVENUE,
http://revenue.louisiana.gov/CorporationIncomeAndFranchiseTaxes#IncomeTax
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Primarily, the LCRO would be responsible for oversight of charities
operating in Louisiana. The LCRO would promote and distribute uniform
rules and regulations that charities must follow, apprising charitable
organizations of exactly what standards they must follow. 210 The greatest
benefit of the LCRO is the unified system of oversight and standardized
accountability in a central enforcement body.
To ensure transparency and garner the public’s trust in this new model,
the LCRO would make the results of investigations publicly available.211
In addition, an independent auditor would review the LCRO’s operations
and finances and provide a copy of this report to the state committee and the
public.212 An additional check on the LCRO’s operations could include a
charity’s ability to appeal decisions through the regular judicial process.213
B. The Necessity of a Self-Funded Model
A self-funded model would allow the LCRO the flexibility needed to
adapt and meet the needs of the charities it governs.214 To achieve selfsustaining status, the LCRO would charge a mandatory annual fee to all
charitable organizations operating in the state, rather than only the ones
using charitable solicitors.215 To avoid drastic burdens and overcharges on
smaller organizations, the LCRO would enforce the mandatory fee on a
sliding scale, dependent on the charity’s annual donations.216 These
proceeds would be used to run the LCRO’s day-to-day operations of
charitable oversight. Other fee assessments could include an application fee,
fines, and settlement awards against charities that violate LCRO regulations.

[http://perma.cc/45K6-GTU9] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). LCRO would usurp this
power from the Louisiana Department of Revenue, and develop its own criteria for
determining state tax-exempt status within Louisiana.
210. For an example of what this might look like, see EDMUND G. BROWN JR.,
CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES (2005) available at
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/charities/publications/guide_for_charities.
pdf [http://perma.cc/6DCD-8K5N].
211. Helge, supra note 58, at 75.
212. Id. at 71.
213. Id. at 75. A charity’s decision to remove an individual director would also
be appealable directly by the individual.
214. To get started, the LCRO may require government funding to begin
operations; however, the goal would be to wean off government involvement over
a set period of years.
215. See supra Part II.G.
216. See supra note 131.
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C. The Benefits of a New System of Oversight
Although some problems, including the lack of funding for
enforcement, could be solved without removing authority from the
attorney general, a new state regulatory organization would more squarely
address all of the constraints that currently hinder the office.217 A primary
benefit of the LCRO is having an oversight body focused solely on the
regulation of the charitable sector. Also, the LCRO would overcome the
financial constraints that currently impede effective charitable oversight
from the attorney general’s office. Annual fees from charities would help
ensure that the LCRO has the flexibility needed to adjust and correct the
enforcement needs of the charitable sector.218
The LCRO would also avoid political and governmental constraints
that hinder present enforcement. A current system that the LCRO could
aim to mimic is FINRA.219 The LCRO could additionally remove political
influences by including broad representation on the executive board, thus
protecting against governmental and political influence.220 Transparency,
independent audits, and oversight from the state committee would ensure
that the executive board is using effective enforcement measures free from
political agendas.221 Although the possibility of making changes to the
current oversight system exists, restructuring and restarting with the
LCRO would allow an oversight model to be fashioned in a way to address
the issues with the current system.
D. LCRO Problems to Consider
A significant obstacle to creating a new state-level regulatory
organization is a lack of political will.222 Very few state legislatures have
217. Helge, supra note 58, at 79.
218. Id.
219. See supra Part II.C. Other private organizations that regulate
professionals, such as the American Bar Association and the American Medical
Association, could also be used as examples in developing LCRO. See generally
ABA Mission and Goals, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/about
_the_aba/aba-mission-goals.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2015); AMA Mission &
Guiding Principles, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/aboutama.page? (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
220. Helge, supra note 58, at 80.
221. See generally Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 537 (addressing
concerns of political capture in a new enforcement model).
222. Id. at 545. Political will is “the demonstrated credible intent of political
actors to take meaningful action towards reform.” Fran Quigley, Growing
Political Will from the Grassroots: How Social Movement Principles Can Reverse
the Dismal Legacy of Rule of Law Interventions, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
13, 16 n.8 (2009).
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passed legislation requiring depth in charitable oversight, and “whether
any state legislature[] [has] provided the state attorney general’s office
with adequate funding or staffing to effectively regulate charities” is
dubious.223 Louisiana’s legislature would have to take a more proactive
approach in charitable oversight and realize the problems current oversight
measures present. But scholarly criticism and the influence from states that
have developed better enforcement procedures have begun to push charitable
reform to a national level, which may help overcome this obstacle.224
Another potential concern is coordination between a new regulatory
organization and other state and federal oversight agencies.225 The LCRO will
also have to coordinate with the IRS.226 A strong developmental and planning
phase prior to implementation will ease the transition to LCRO oversight. This
type of planning stage will help ensure that all organizations are on the same
page when the LCRO begins to operate. There is no one correct way to offset
the coordination concern; it will be important to take note of the issue in the
transition phase.
A bigger concern is the coordination between the LCRO and
regulatory programs of other states. This problem is probably not entirely
solvable but can be mitigated through various measures. First, the LCRO
would need to have absolute clarity in its regulations to ensure that
charities operating in multiple states know exactly what is expected of
them in Louisiana.227 Secondly, the LCRO’s model would not be entirely
different from the current regulatory system in place, allowing charities to
easily operate in Louisiana and other states. Although the state-to-state
enforcement problem is a concern, it can be mitigated with a detailed
transition and planning phase that directly communicates to charities
operating in Louisiana what to expect before the LCRO officially begins
operations.
The state legislative committee tasked with chartering the LCRO
could appoint members or former members of the attorney general’s office
to the LCRO’s executive board to smooth the transition of oversight to the
organization. The attorney general’s office may be hesitant to give up its
power to regulate charitable organizations, so this type of appointment
could help ease the transition. Although the public could see switching to

223. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 545.
224. Another problem with implementing LCRO could be the challenges faced
when a new agency or commission is created. These issues, however, are beyond
the scope of this Comment.
225. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 541.
226. Id. at 542.
227. The LCRO could also issue private letter rulings, like the IRS, to charities
questioning their compliance with the new regulations.
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a new system as a waste of resources,228 the positive effects that the LCRO
would have on charitable oversight would outweigh the problems created
by Louisiana’s transition to the organization.
CONCLUSION
A new enforcement model is necessary to properly monitor charitable
organizations in Louisiana. Current restrictions on oversight through the
attorney general’s office and a lack of proper enforcement measures have
made efficient regulation of the charitable sector practically nonexistent.
The charitable sector must maintain the public’s confidence, making
reform necessary. Although no solution may be the perfect solution, the
current oversight problems provide an opportunity for Louisiana to adopt
a new enforcement model. A self-funded state regulatory organization,
such as the LCRO, will address the financial, political, and organizational
constraints that hinder oversight through the attorney general’s office. The
new system will allow Louisiana to set a precedent for charity reform
across the country and finally address a problem scholars have criticized
for over 50 years.

Maxwell B. Kallenberger

228. See id. at 520 (suggesting that taking advantage of existing attorney
general expertise in a new model would cut back on waste in the transition to a
new enforcement organization).
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